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Between Geopolitics and Transformation: 
Challenges and Perspectives for the  
Eastern Partnership
Hans Martin Sieg 
Summary The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) faces a double challenge. The 
transformation of post-Soviet countries it was designed to support has largely 
failed to emerge. In its place, a conflict with Russia has arisen for which the EaP 
was unprepared. This spells a dilemma. Rather than support EaP governments on 
the basis of their reform records, the EU is tempted to back them for the geopoli-
tical choices they have made (namely, for their professed pro-European positions). 
In the long run, however, the EaP cannot succeed without delivering on its “trans-
formational agenda.” Even in countries that have already signed Association Ag-
reements with the EU, the ultimate success of the EaP is in question. This analysis 
describes the EaP’s “transformational challenge.” It argues that geopolitical com-
petition with Russia was neither avoidable nor will it be easy to overcome. The key 
obstacle to change, however, is not geopolitical competition but the veto power 
of vested interests within EaP countries themselves. Since this veto power marks 
a crucial difference from conditions that prevailed in EU enlargements in Central 
Europe, the EaP’s response must apply a different transformational logic. The EU 
must go beyond merely supporting reforms in the EaP and effectively take co-
responsibility for them. This involves upgrading the principle of conditionality and 
getting involved more directly in implementation. The paper concludes by stressing 
the importance of human resources in state institutions and proposes concrete 
measures for appointing and retaining qualified personnel and, particularly, inde-
pendent leaders for key law enforcement and regulatory bodies.
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Introduction
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) emerged in response 
both to the European aspirations of post-Soviet coun-
tries and to the lack of social and economic develop-
ment, systematic corruption, persistent deficiencies in 
the rule of law and democracy, and the resulting threat 
to political stability and regional security in post-Soviet 
Europe.1 From the start, the initiative was also a com-
promise between mainly eastern European EU member 
states who were interested in expanding EU integra-
tion further eastward and EU member states mainly in 
western Europe who were wary of making additional 
commitments.
The EaP was correspondingly ambiguous about the 
EU membership perspective of the countries in its pur-
view, but the Association Agreements to be concluded 
between individual EaP countries and the EU set out 
ambitious goals for transformation toward a liberal 
democracy based on the rule of law, good governance, 
and a market economy. The key element of the agree-
ment – the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA) to be established with EaP countries – was to 
offer far-reaching economic integration into the Europe-
an common market. In particular, economic integration 
was intended to serve as a key driver of change; a viable 
market economy required functioning state institu-
tions (regulatory bodies, in particular) and judicial 
institutions that would improve the rule of law. Since 
the negotiations and the implementation of the DCFTA 
were expected to take at least a decade, visa liberaliza-
tion was added – a feature that could be delivered in the 
shorter term.
The EaP rests on two implicit assumptions. The first 
is that it could essentially follow the same logic that un-
derpinned democratic and economic change in Central 
Eastern European countries during their respective EU 
accession processes.2 Essentially, the EaP was to offer a 
kind of “light version” of EU enlargement, in which the 
EU would support reforms while relying on local elites 
to implement them. The EaP offered long- and mid-term 
benefits to societies as a whole, but its success depended 
on the assumption that local economic and political 
elites would be interested in reaping them.
The second assumption was that the integration of-
fered by the EaP would find broad popular support as 
well as the broad support of political forces within the 
countries. No competing model of integration existed at 
the time, as it does today in the Eurasian Union spon-
sored by Russia. To be sure, Russia always had reserva-
tions about Western interference in its neighborhood, 
and relations between Russia and the EU were already 
strained over various issues. But for most EU policy 
makers, the EaP was not intended to ignite a conflict 
with Russia.
Today the EaP faces a double challenge. The transfor-
mation it was meant to bring about has largely failed to 
materialize, whereas a conflict with Russia for which it 
was not designed has come to the fore. As a consequence, 
the EaP region has become more instead of less divided. 
Because of their democratic deficiencies, it was never 
anticipated that Belarus and Azerbaijan would fully 
participate in the EaP’s offers. For its part, Armenia had to 
opt out of signing an Association Agreement with the EU 
in September 2013 in order not to strain its relations with 
Russia. That has effectively left the EaP with the three 
countries that have concluded Association Agreements: 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. This analysis therefore 
focuses on the reform challenges that the EaP faces in 
these countries.
Of these three countries, Ukraine faces a war; Georgia 
seems to be suffering a certain stagnation (thought its 
reform process is most advanced); and Moldova, once 
hailed as the success story of the EaP, has suffered a major 
backlash in its development toward democracy and the 
rule of law. 
The result is a dilemma. The EU’s agenda has been 
increasingly overshadowed and contradicted by a largely 
geopolitical concern: competition with Russia. In the 
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short run, this suggests that the EU should support gov-
ernments for professing to be pro-European regardless of 
their reform records. In the long run, however, the East-
ern Partnership – like any geopolitical goal the EU may 
pursue in post-Soviet Europe – cannot succeed without 
delivering on its transformational agenda.
Geopolitical Context:  
The Ambiguity of the EaP
The escalating conflict with Russia over post-Soviet East-
ern Europe caught the EU rather unprepared. The EaP 
had made no provisions for a confrontation with Russia in 
the post-Soviet neighborhood. It did not contain instru-
ments for supporting its partners against Russian repri-
sals. Russia, however, had always opposed the build-up of 
Western influence in its neighborhood in general and the 
EaP in particular (though not always with the same inten-
sity). Why, then, was the EU unprepared for conflict?
The answer lies partly in the general nature of EU 
policy making. The EU’s strength tends to lie more in its 
transformational powers than in a capacity to act strategi-
cally. Since EU policies must be negotiated by all mem-
ber states, taking each state’s interests and values into 
consideration, the EU usually has difficulties setting and 
following coherent objectives, to say nothing of respond-
ing flexibly to the interactive nature of strategy. In times 
of crisis, this condemns the EU to a reactive rather than 
pro-active role. The EaP – as a compromise of diverse 
viewpoints within the EU – was from the outset defined 
less by a shared vision of the EU’s strategic goals than by 
two crucial reservations.
First, the majority of EU member states and EU institu-
tions wanted for domestic political reasons to forestall 
a new enlargement debate. This conflicted with the 
interests of newer member states who sought further 
enlargement to the east. This internal tension was never 
really overcome. In particular the 2008 war in Georgia 
helped prompt the EU to move forward with the initiative, 
even though it had not achieved general consensus on the 
EaP’s purpose and reach.
Second, while some of the EaP’s supporters did in fact 
see EU integration in Eastern Europe as a means of con-
taining Moscow, most European leaders and politicians 
shared reservations about entering into a conflict with 
Russia. The EaP was conceived as a form of “soft-power” 
competition but not as an instrument of the “hard-power” 
competition with Russia that eventually ensued. 
As a result, the EaP remained ambiguous. In substance, 
the integration the EaP offered was, and continues to 
be, far reaching. With DCFTA, the economies of partner 
countries would largely be integrated into the EU’s com-
mon market. The political reforms it entailed would bring 
the countries quite close to EU standards. The full imple-
mentation of the Association Agreements would pave the 
way to EU accession – with the process of joining the EU 
as a comparatively smaller next step.
EU leaders, when responding to EaP partner countries’ 
demands for a clear EU membership perspective, regu-
larly needed to point out that the EaP could bring them 
closer to eventual future accession. Particularly in West-
ern Europe, however, EU leaders needed to downplay the 
extent of the integration offers contained within the EaP 
– in particular implications for future EU enlargement. 
The different needs involved in addressing foreign and 
domestic audiences necessarily led to mixed and some-
times conflicting messages. 
The compromise nature of EU policies and the fact that 
the EU as a Union of (still) 28 member states, each with its 
own pluralistic systems and lacking a definitive authority 
to clarify positions, leaves broad space for interpretation 
and speculation about the intentions behind EU policies. 
As a consequence, one can encounter voices in the EU that 
can be taken to confirm virtually any narrative – as well 
as its opposite. This includes the current Russian narra-
tive, according to which the EaP is a deliberate strategy to 
extend the EU’s geopolitical influence at Russia’s expense. 
In reality, a double case of denial has shaped EU  
attitudes toward the EaP and its relations toward Russia: 
first, the denial that the EaP would harm Russian inter-
ests and thus that there would be any reason for conflict 
and, second, the denial of the legitimacy of Russian reser-
vations about the EaP.
1) Russia, following a “realist” understanding of inter-
national relations, views the conflict as a zero-sum game 
for power and influence and expects its interests to be 
respected. For the EU, the EaP is more about promoting 
development than about geopolitical interests. Conse-
quently, the EU rejected the EaP as a reason for conflict. 
Russia, for its part, likely misread EU communication on 
the EaP as assurances that EU interference in the post-
Soviet neighborhood would be limited, therefore under-
estimating the extent of the integration offers that the 
EaP in fact embodied. This may explain why Moscow’s 
resistance to the EaP did not harden until shortly before 
the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and 
Georgia were to be signed in Vilnius in late 2013.
2) On a fundamental level, the EU’s strategic culture is 
built on rejecting the hierarchical relationships of tradi-
tional power politics and spheres of influence. Instead, it 
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aims for cooperation that seeks common gains in terms 
of liberal values. This culture is what led EU politicians 
to deny the legitimacy of Russian interference or even its 
objections to the EaP. Because they considered Russia’s 
objections neither legitimate nor founded, EU leaders – 
while not themselves intending conflict – disregarded the 
emerging conflict instead of preparing for it.
A major weakness of the EaP is thus that it was 
ill-equipped from the start for what turned out to be 
unavoidable competition and eventual conflict with its 
largest neighbor to the east. The EaP offers partner coun-
tries long-term benefits in terms of development. Russia, 
however, can provide not only considerable short-term 
benefits – such as reduced energy prices and loans – to 
those same countries but also short-term disincentives. 
These include imposing trade sanctions, limiting access 
to migrant workers, negative propaganda by influential 
Russian media, sponsoring domestic opposition, and, not 
least, raising tensions in separatist regions, supporting 
armed insurgents, and sponsoring outside intervention. 
While armed intervention on Russia’s part allowed for 
no direct response from the EU apart from political and 
economic sanctions, the EaP also offered little by way of 
an arsenal to counter even the other measures Russia had 
at its disposal.
Geopolitical Context:  
The Ambiguity of Russia’s Policy
Far from being designed for conflict, the EaP was actually 
designed to complement the agreements Russia had with 
the same countries. These included free trade agreements 
to be negotiated between members of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). It was only later that Russia 
promoted the customs union with Belarus and Kazakh-
stan (founded in 2010) and the Eurasian Economic Union 
(finally established in 2015) as a competing and mutually 
exclusive integration project. The subsequent escalation 
of the tension over the EaP can be easily taken as the 
logical result of a coherent Russian strategy to reassert 
its influence in its post-Soviet neighborhood. But when 
the EaP was launched in 2008–09, the extent to which 
this conflict would escalate was far less certain. At the 
time, Russian policy was hampered by its own ambigu-
ity. It struggled to balance its desire to protect its influ-
ence in post-Soviet states with its interest in reaching an 
arrangement with the West (or at least with key Western 
partners).
The country’s foreign policy objectives have not 
changed, but the weight they have been given has – as 
Russia places increasing emphasis on defending its influ-
ence in post-Soviet states. The EaP was only part of the 
reason. In fact, Moscow’s resistance to the EaP hardened 
only after its more ambitious policies to strengthen itself 
at home and abroad had failed. As cause or as a conse-
quence, three primary developments – economic, political, 
and ideological – underlined this shift:
 . Economic developments: Modernization of the Russian 
economy under Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev 
largely failed. Putin had initially set out rather liberal 
modernization programs, but when rising energy prices 
removed financial strain, he resorted to reestablish-
ing state control over major industries. This course left 
him with only the logic of a state-run modernization, 
which proved insufficient to overcoming the Russian 
economy’s lack of competitiveness. Russia continued to 
depend on energy exports, with unfavorable exchange 
rates as one consequence. Industry remained uncom-
petitive, and liberal reformers who promoted free trade 
with the West as an instrument of modernization found 
themselves marginalized. As Russia became more 
inclined toward protectionism, the rationale grew for 
consolidating Moscow’s own trade block in the post-
Soviet sphere.
 . Political developments: Until well into the Medvedev 
presidency, the main foreign policy objective was to 
reach a broader settlement with at least key Western 
partners on two major objectives: to be recognized – in 
particular by the US – as a peer power whose interests 
had to be respected, and to achieve greater inclusion 
– essentially, veto power – within a remodeled Euro-
pean security architecture. However, the geopolitical 
bargain Russia sought proved irreconcilable with the 
West’s mix of geopolitical interests and liberal values. 
As a result, Russian strategy was readjusted, particu-
larly during Putin’s third term as president, on the basis 
of closer ties to China and an entrenchment in the post-
Soviet sphere to counter Western influence there.
 . Ideological developments: There has been a deliber-
ate deepening of the rift between Russia and the West, 
particularly in terms of perceived differences in values. 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia’s leaders 
used to justify divergences from the Western model of 
liberal democracy and market economy by citing the 
country’s distinctive challenges; notions of a “sover-
eign” or “guided democracy,” though designed to shield 
Russian leaders from criticism, tended to confirm 
rather than contradict this. As the country’s political 
system became more authoritarian, however, tensions 
Challenges and Perspectives for the Eastern Partnership  5
DGAPanalyse  / Nr. 10 / November 2016
with the West intensified. The “color revolutions” and 
the effects of the 2008 financial crisis threatened the 
legitimacy of Russia’s political system, and its leaders 
increasingly resorted to stressing particular “values” to 
set Russia apart “the West.” Putin’s third presidential 
term has signaled a major shift in this regard, making 
direct appeals to conservatism rooted in Russian and 
Orthodox traditions and to the superiority of “Russian 
values” over Western “decadence,” all accompanied by 
an increasingly polarizing propaganda.
Russia’s Objections to the EaP
The economic, political, and ideological developments 
outlined above considerably deepened the struggle over 
the EaP. Initially, in 2008, neither the EU nor Russia 
sought conflict, but this is not to say that confrontation 
itself was avoidable. Indeed, in its original design – and 
contrary to its intention – the EaP was bound to lead to 
a conflict. By its nature, the EaP presented Moscow with 
economic, political, and ideological challenges that have 
only mutually reinforced each other with domestic devel-
opments in each of these areas and will remain crucial as 
the conflict evolves:
 . Economically, Russia has emphasized its concern that – 
through both DCFTA and the free trade agreement the 
CIS countries had among themselves – EU goods could 
flood the Russian market, bypassing Russian tariffs by 
way of relabeling. It used this argument, together with 
concerns about sanitary and food safety standards, to 
justify the de facto trade sanctions against Ukraine and 
Moldova in the process of concluding the Association 
Agreements. Though Russia’s concern is not entirely 
unfounded, such abuses can be contained through im-
proved use of certificates of origin. Another economic 
objection is that if EaP countries implement EU stan-
dards, they would also diverge from standards shared 
with Russia, complicating economic transactions. 
Although Russian companies also need to adjust to EU 
standards for their exports to the EU, this only adds to 
Russia’s interest in strengthening its own trade block 
in order to counter the EU’s agenda-setting power in 
future trade negotiations. Overall, Russia has stressed 
its economic concerns not because these concerns are in 
themselves so important but because they provide the 
best legal grounds for objecting to the EaP. Such prob-
lems could be solved if Moscow had the political will.
 . Politically, Russia has had to envision a considerable 
loss of influence and leverage over EaP countries. If the 
EaP succeeds, the economic links between EaP coun-
tries and the EU would grow much faster than their 
links to Russia, gradually outweighing the latter. Politi-
cal proximity to Europe would follow. A successful EaP 
would widen systemic differences with Russia. Demo-
cratic and economic reform in EaP countries would 
stabilize them, thereby strengthening them against 
external political interference. The result, for Moscow, 
would be a loss of leverage over its neighbors, perhaps 
eventually culminating in their accession to the EU or 
to NATO. (Russia should not be expected to discern a 
fundamental distinction between European integration 
and NATO enlargement. The one could be the key to 
the other.) For Russia, a flourishing EaP could effec-
tively spell the dissolution of its sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe and leave it with a stark choice: either 
adjust to the European integration process or become 
isolated in Europe.
 . Ideologically, too, the potential democratic transforma-
tion of key post-Soviet states would directly challenge 
Moscow. As Russia increasingly stresses its own values 
and the virtues of its political system in comparison 
with the West, it is emphasizing common cultural 
bonds – including the Orthodox tradition – with its 
neighbors, Ukraine in particular. If European integra-
tion and Western political and economic models suc-
ceed in post-Soviet countries, it would call into ques-
tion the distinctiveness of Russian values and the very 
foundation that post-Soviet societies are said to share. 
By the same token, political developments in other 
post-Soviet countries could be taken as models of what 
is possible in Russia. Certainly, Russian leaders have no 
wish to see the emergence of more pro-Western protest 
movements such as Maidan nor to see them succeed in 
bringing sustainable political change.
The Impact of Russian Resistance  
to the EaP
The key objectives of Russia and the EU in the region 
are different not only in direction but in kind. Whereas 
Russia sees the struggle over the EaP primarily as one of 
interests, for the EU it is a matter both of interests and of 
values. As a result, each side disregards the motives of  
the other; Russia dismisses EU values as a mere pre-
text for advancing geopolitical ambitions, while the EU 
dismisses Russia’s objections as illegitimate. The setting 
opens little space for compromise; the conflict may be 
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managed but it will not be solved easily and will likely 
persist for years.
The form of the current conflict, like its causes, has 
been asymmetrical. Exploiting EU weaknesses, Russia re-
sponded to EU soft power with instruments of hard power. 
At the same time it developed and employed its own soft 
power in the form of effective propaganda while the EU 
was distracted by crises over the euro, refugees, and, 
finally, the Brexit referendum. But one should not expect 
too much of a master plan on the Russian side. Overall, 
Russia’s policies look more reactive than strategic. 
As noted, Russia’s resistance to the EaP was late to 
harden. Its efforts to prevent Viktor Yanukovych from 
signing Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU in 
November 2013 came at the last minute before the Vilnius 
summit. This makeshift attempt backfired, bringing 
about the pro-European Maidan movement and Yanu-
kovych’s ouster. This outcome was quite predictable in 
advance. In the escalation that followed, Russia rapidly 
created a set of faits accomplis – the occupation of Crimea, 
the conflicts in eastern Ukraine – but it was neither oblivi-
ous to international reactions nor willing to risk greater 
involvement by forcefully extending armed conflict to 
other parts of Ukraine. Russia’s strategy has been clear 
about the developments it wants to prevent but far less 
concrete about the What and the How of its objectives.
Russia, moreover, has been no more successful than 
the EU in achieving its objectives. Only in the case of 
Armenia did it manage to turn the country away from 
European integration and toward Eurasian integration. 
In Ukraine, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and control of 
secessionists over portions of the Donetsk and Lugansk 
regions will still spell geopolitical loss if the rest of the 
country consolidates while maintaining a pro-EU course. 
Indeed, Russia’s intervention turned Ukraine’s broad pub-
lic against it – a high cost that included losing leverage 
over developments in the country and helping to consoli-
date Ukrainian identity. Where Russia has used military 
force, as it did in Georgia and Ukraine, national societies 
have tended to rally to the pro-Western cause.
The most important impact of Russia’s opposition 
to the EaP is less direct: that the “Russian factor” has 
strengthened the leverage of vested interests within EaP 
countries, helping these deadlock the reform process, 
particularly in Ukraine and Moldova. Russian pressure 
did not itself prevent any reform, but it strengthened the 
veto power of vested interests against reform by offering 
an excuse and by weakening reform pressure from the 
EU. Geopolitical competition with Russia has pushed the 
EU into supporting pro-EU governments regardless of 
their real reform records. Furthermore, the build-up of 
pro-Russian parties in EaP countries, combined with Rus-
sian propaganda, have had a polarizing effect on citizens, 
pressuring them to choose between Russia and the EU. 
This is the case particularly in Moldova today, as it was in 
Ukraine before the Maidan movement.
This polarization was largely absent from Central East-
ern European countries at the time of their EU accession. 
Although governments there regularly lost elections and 
power, all important political forces agreed on the need 
to pursue reforms as well as on their general direction. In 
EaP countries, on the other hand, every reformer must 
fight on two fronts: against an opposition that threatens 
to fundamentally reverse the pro-European course and 
against vested interests within their own political camps, 
actors whose blocking powers increase as they can sway 
the balance. For pro-European forces, the main objective 
has therefore shifted from pushing for reforms toward 
reaching compromises on reforms in order to stay in 
government. Even in Ukraine, where Russia’s escalation 
strengthened national unity, armed struggle has ham-
pered reform efforts; it has distracted the already limited 
capacities of reform forces in government, thus increasing 
the possibility of vested interests blocking reforms.
This lack of progress turns out to be Russia’s biggest 
advantage in its struggle with the EU. Time is not on the 
EaP’s side. If it fails to deliver on its promise of reform, it 
can neither bring about nor maintain political stability. 
Nor will it be able to maintain public support for a pro-
European course. Failure to make progress will sooner 
or later discredit the project of European integration and 
turn the tide against the EaP. 
Here Russia’s political, military, economic, and infor-
mational interference is a distraction; the key obstacle to 
reform is domestic resistance within EaP counties.
Obstacles to Reform in EaP Countries:  
Social Factors
The EaP’s instruments were modeled largely on previ-
ous EU enlargement processes, and it was assumed that 
its target countries would carry out reforms in much the 
way Central Eastern European countries did. Eight years 
on, however, only Georgia has registered major “trans-
formational” successes – successes that were in larg part 
unconnected to the EaP, having been started and largely 
implemented earlier.
Lack of progress is not due to a general lack of a desire 
for reform within EaP societies or among elites. But re-
Challenges and Perspectives for the Eastern Partnership  7
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form forces in post-Soviet countries have faced far greater 
challenges, and they have met far greater resistance 
against reforms than their Central European counter-
parts. These problems begin with a social fabric that 
limits the opportunities for rallying broad public support 
around a reform agenda.
 . Most post-Soviet countries lack a strong national iden-
tity. National identities are often divided along cultural 
or ethnic lines or competing historical narratives. These 
lines are also a predominant factor in dividing the 
political landscape among different parties, majorities 
and opposition. This complicates building the necessary 
social consensus to embark on truly national projects. 
Every major political project, like European integra-
tion, tends to polarize society along identity lines. Here, 
the stronger national identity present in Georgia helps 
explain why that country’s transformational successes 
have made it an exception among post-Soviet countries.
 . Post-Soviet societies are marked by a high level of inter-
personal mistrust as well as by informal rather than for-
mal rules. Due in part to the Soviet legacy, people tend 
to expect institutions, organizations, laws or rules to be 
just a facade that in reality serves the hidden agenda of 
parallel structures and special interests in the back-
ground. This creates vicious circles. With low trust in 
abstract norms, their effective validity within society is 
also low. People rely on family and personal relations 
far more than on merits, and the former indeed regu-
larly play a far greater role in social advancement.
 . Mistrust has kept the organizational culture at a low 
level. Since building a minimum of confidence for ef-
fective collaboration and information sharing between 
individuals involves a high degree of investment, the 
cost of interaction in society is also high. The efficiency 
of governmental structures suffers from excessive top-
down structures of decision making and a low propensi-
ty to delegate, share information, engage or collaborate 
as well as to plan or coordinate capabilities. This, in 
turn, slows down or even impedes the implementa-
tion of policies, even if the necessary political will for 
reforms exists.
 . This mistrust makes societies highly atomized. Broad 
social interests hardly ever organize themselves in such 
a way that they could gain importance in political life. 
Organized civil society is but a thin layer of rather small 
organizations predominantly dependent on foreign 
donors and without deep social roots. The high level of 
mistrust also makes it far more difficult to rally citizens 
around a positive agenda than to discredit political 
projects and their proponents. That is why democratic 
processes in post-Soviet states have not usually been a 
driving force for reform but are instead easily coopted 
by vested interests.
Obstacles to Reform in EaP Countries: 
Vested Interests
The most important obstacle to reforms is the resistance 
of vested interests. Oligarchic structures have emerged 
across post-Soviet Eastern Europe, with the notable 
exception of Belarus (which therefore does not factor into 
the examples given below). The term “oligarchic struc-
ture” describes the mutually reinforcing control by or 
crucial influence of businesspeople over economic assets, 
mass media, political parties, and key state institutions 
excluded from political and economic competition. The 
power of vested interests usually rests on five pillars:
1) Economic power: In large parts, a rent-seeking econo-
my prevails, divided into monopolistic or oligopolis-
tic structures. Non-transparent ownership structures 
and offshore connections can be used to conceal 
operations, including raider attacks and money 
laundering schemes. The extent of state enterprises, 
their non-transparency, and their possible privatiza-
tion offer ample opportunities for those in power to 
tap into financial flows, or channel them for purposes 
of maintaining or extending political loyalties and 
control.
2) Systemic corruption: Weak state institutions – and 
the civil service – are highly vulnerable to the influ-
ence of vested interests and resistant to reform. “Sys-
temic” here does not mean that officials are gener-
ally corrupt but rather that corruption is so regular 
that institutions have few defenses of their own to 
safeguard against it. The extent of corruption and its 
widespread passive acceptance is closely connected 
to the low salaries of public servants. It also leads 
to high turnover, particularly among more qualified 
and more scrupulous personnel, further weakening 
institutions. Because of low salaries, office hold-
ers are more susceptible to extracting or accepting 
bribes or to taking “parallel payments” in exchange 
for political loyalty. This results in dependencies that 
supersede the hierarchy and duties of public office, 
reinforced by a vulnerability to prosecution and 
blackmailing, and a vital self-interest in maintaining 
the status quo. Corruption, in short, creates parallel 
and informal chains of loyalty and command.
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3) Control over state institutions: Corruption and the 
establishment of “spoils systems” enable those in 
power to stuff institutions with their own clients, 
leading to the emergence of parallel structures of 
command, rewards, and sanctions in public au-
thorities. Vested interests can effectively bypass the 
control of constitutional authorities in parliament 
and government. Their main targets have been in-
stitutions that can provide direct resources of power 
such as judicial, law enforcement, and financial 
authorities as well as key regulatory bodies. Control 
over these authorities allows them to protect and 
redistribute economic assets, enforce loyalties, and 
punish opponents. In Ukraine regional strongholds 
have evolved under the control of different oligarchs, 
whereas in smaller Moldova an unprecedented level 
of oligarchic control over central national institu-
tions has developed.
4) Control over parties, or parts of parties: Vested 
interests maintain strong influence over constitu-
tional powers and protect their oligarchic struc-
tures against political interventions. Generally this 
happens by creating financial dependencies of party 
structures and/or relevant members. Quite regularly, 
sub-parties within parliamentary parties have helped 
obstruct policies their respective parties were elected 
to promote. Legislation restricting party financing, 
protecting against corruption, or promoting trans-
parency can be selectively enforced, even abused, to 
exercise retribution or deter donations from other 
sources. This can help shield actors from potential 
competitors within or by other political parties. Laws 
on state financing of parties, though passed, still 
need to show an effect. Meanwhile, party financing 
through membership fees or crowd funding is imped-
ed by low incomes, a lack of relevant traditions, and 
bureaucratic restrictions. This makes any bottom-
up party building particularly difficult, as does the 
fact that civil society has yet to put down deep roots. 
Thus, without directly manipulating elections,  
vested interests can effectively check democratic 
processes by narrowing down the choices that voters 
have in the first place – and ultimately controlling 
them.
5) Control over the media: This reinforces oligarchal 
control over parties and helps them consolidate 
political power. The extent of truly independent mass 
media is very limited in all post-Soviet countries. 
Mass media ownership is usually a political rather 
than an economic investment and is used to promote 
particular interests or parties, discredit opponents, or 
block coverage of them in the first place. Control over 
the advertising market can be an additional tool to 
impede the development of independent media.
Comparing the Eastern Partnership to the 
EU Enlargement Process of 2004–07
The factors described above were generally also pres-
ent, albeit in much weaker form, in Central and Eastern 
European countries before they joined the EU. In former 
Soviet countries like Ukraine and Moldova, however, they 
are far more pronounced. Here vested interests enjoy 
effective blocking powers on a scale that did not exist 
in Central Eastern European countries. This veto power, 
next to geopolitical polarization, has been the major 
distinction between the EaP and previous EU enlarge-
ment processes. These vested interests, moreover, have 
points of intersection with different geopolitical camps; 
their power is well established and needs to be overcome 
within pro-European parties.
Lack of progress in EaP countries is often attributed 
to the absence of a supposedly crucial incentive: a clear 
EU membership perspective. This explanation falls short, 
however. There is no way that a membership perspective 
could overcome the inherent antagonism between serious 
reforms and vested interests. Representatives of vested 
interests may advocate for the EU membership perspec-
tive in order to increase their political legitimacy at home. 
But it would offer them no real incentive to undertake 
reforms. Nor would it remove their power to obstruct 
reforms.
It is not so much the absence of the membership per-
spective as the logic of the enlargement processes itself 
that is unsuitable for post-Soviet countries. This logic 
was based on the understanding that transformation 
would follow democratization – that the EU would offer 
blueprints and assistance but that the countries would 
undertake the reforms themselves, responsibility for 
which would rest solely with local elites. But there were 
two preconditions: 1) that there would be a broad consen-
sus among elites for the substance as well as the direction 
of reforms and 2) that holding constitutional offices in 
government and parliament would provide reform forces 
with the necessary power to implement crucial reforms.
In EaP countries, such a consensus does not exist both 
because of geopolitical polarization and the strength of 
vested interests. Nor have constitutional offices provided 
the necessary authority to push through crucial reforms, 
being deadlocked or bypassed by vested interests. For re-
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formers, merely being in government and parliament has 
not meant holding the reins of power. Unlike the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine of 2004–05 or the April 2009 pro-
test in Moldova, only Georgia’s Rose Revolution brought 
to power leaders who were determined, united, and also 
strong enough to bring change. (This is another explana-
tion why Georgia is an exception among EaP countries.) 
Far more than Central Eastern European countries, the 
key tasks in Eastern Europe are those of state and institu-
tion building: asserting constitutional authorities, checks 
and balances as wells as accountable institutions. It will 
be quite difficult to reconcile vested interests with this re-
quirement. Even if key representatives of vested interests 
accept the need for change, the weakness of state institu-
tions still poses a dilemma for them: if they relinquish 
influence who will take over? Who can ensure that these 
new forces will be accountable to the rule of law? Instead 
of becoming truly independent, institutions risk being 
taken over by a rival, turning an asset into a threat. 
To liberate state institutions captured by vested inter-
ests may thus prove to be even more challenging than 
liberalizing an authoritarian state. Here the task is to 
change the way power is exercised, redefining the com-
mand structure within the state. In the case of most EaP 
countries, there is largely just a façade of a state, with no 
clear command structure to start with. This would need 
first to be rebuilt, by eradicating all the parallel, informal, 
and corrupt chains of control that hide behind the façade. 
Reviewing the EU’s Interests in EaP 
Countries
The very limited success of the EaP thus far suggests that 
the EU must either scale down its objectives or ramp up 
the means it employs. This requires a thorough review 
of the EU’s interests in EaP countries, weighing two 
different kinds of interest. The first can be construed as 
geopolitical. In this respect a maximum goal would be 
the successful integration of EaP countries into DCFTA 
under stable pro-European governments and a minimum 
goal would be preventing their forceful submission to 
Russia. The second interest is “transformational,” – that 
is, ensuring the development of liberal democracy based 
on the rule of law and the market economy. Ideally, both 
interests should go hand in hand, promoting the values 
and enhancing the security of the EU.
Previous experiences with the EaP, however, show 
contradictions between geopolitical and transformational 
goals, at least between the short run and the long run. 
Short-term geopolitical interests may be prompting the 
EU to support pro-European governments even when they 
show poor reform records. But this approach offers vested 
interests ample opportunities to exploit EU support for 
their own ends instead of delivering reform, and with it 
the EU risks being associated with corrupt actors in the 
long run, which would ultimately discredit the project of 
European integration. Considering the post-Soviet reali-
ties of these countries, pushing a policy whose immediate 
goal is to merely prevent pro-Russian forces from coming 
to power would likely be self-defeating, meeting neither 
geopolitical nor transformational goals. For the EaP to 
have long-term success, particularly in Ukraine and 
Moldova, it must go far beyond what has heretofore been 
achieved.
The EaP’s transformational shortcomings might hy-
pothetically suggest the need for a “realistic” adjustment 
toward a minimum geopolitical goal. Such a scenario 
could involve reaching an arrangement with Moscow 
that would turn in particular the Ukraine and Moldova 
into kind of a neutral zone. The EU would downgrade 
its Association Agreements with those countries, largely 
excluding the political elements and taking the “deep 
and comprehensive” element out of the free trade zone. 
In such a scenario, those countries would benefit from 
simple free trade agreements with both Russia and the 
EU. This, in turn, would preclude their integration into 
the Eurasian Union.
Such a geopolitical arrangement, even if it met with 
Moscow’s consent, is a theoretical option only, for it 
would hardly find consensus within the EU. Both within 
the EU and within EaP countries it would widely be 
interpreted as a betrayal of European values: a surrender 
of the EU’s solidarity with post-Soviet Europe held captive 
by Russian interference and by the veto power of vested 
interests. But quite apart from values, such an arrange-
ment would also compromise a crucial security interest 
of the EU that is not linked to geopolitics. The lack of 
transformational progress within post-Soviet countries 
themselves entails considerable risks to the EU. For Rus-
sia offers no alternative model for sustainable social and 
economic development. Nor can it realistically subsidize 
its post-Soviet neighbors in the long run.
Particularly in Moldova and Ukraine, the socio-eco-
nomic situation is anything but stable. It is not just stag-
nating but in many aspects deteriorating. The economy’s 
rent-seeking structure neither attracts nor generates 
much investment or innovation, further decreasing 
competiveness and increasing dependence on finance 
from abroad (in the form of remittances, loans, and 
international assistance, which may not be sustainable). 
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People are emigrating en masse, depriving their coun-
tries of young, skilled, and well-educated workers while 
the number of dependents rises. This demographic trend 
leaves little time for a transformational breakthrough. 
Over time, this demographic trend will harden clientelist 
mentalities within society, reinforcing the electorate’s 
authoritarian sentiment and eroding support for liberal 
reforms. 
Which models could flourish in the future if these 
trends prevail? There is a risk that the habitat will be-
come increasingly favorable to various forms of illegal 
trafficking and organized crime, which will operate 
across EU borders. At the same time, the effective priva-
tization of state authorities in conjunction with systemic 
corruption could undermine the state’s legitimacy, lead-
ing to state failure or disintegration. This was what eased 
the takeover of power by separatists in eastern Ukraine; 
in the worst case, Russia would only need to pick up the 
fragments piece by piece. 
The social and economic decline of post-Soviet coun-
tries, the prospect of state capture, and even the disin-
tegration of states could create more direct threats to 
regional stability and to the security of the EU than the 
geopolitical ambitions of Russia in Eastern Europe.
Rethinking Conditionality
To meet the transformational challenge, the EU must 
adjust the EaP’s instruments. Current incentives and 
support for reforms are insufficient. In Ukraine today, 
the shockwaves caused by both the Maidan movement 
and Russia’s intervention may in fact be rallying enough 
popular and elite support to the reform agenda to make 
genuine progress possible. As in other EaP countries, 
however, this outcome is still far from certain, not for lack 
of general support for reforms within society but because 
vested interests are still structurally entrenched.
In order to overcome the resistance of vested interests, 
EU policies need to become involved far more directly in 
reforms, effectively allying EU efforts with reforms forces 
on the ground. This shift in the EaP could be described 
as a change from supporting reforms toward accepting 
joint responsibility for them. If governments will not – or 
cannot – implement crucial reforms on their own, the 
EU must shift from setting general reform goals toward 
putting concrete reform proposals on the table – and 
then reinforcing reform implementation directly with 
EU instruments and experts. Such instruments can be 
employed without infringing on a state’s sovereignty – a 
major concern for the EU. At the same time, they would 
reflect the fact that the political and legal framework of 
relations between the EU and Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine goes far beyond “international relations as usual,” 
reflecting those countries’ European aspirations and the 
commitments they have already made under their respec-
tive Association Agreements.
As a first step, the EU needs not only to employ stricter 
conditionality but also to upgrade that conditionality by 
detailing and prioritizing standards. The Association 
Agreements list the adjustments necessary for DCFTA, but 
the standards put forward by the EU on crucial politi-
cal reforms have remained rather general and broad. 
This has made it difficult for the EU to employ concrete 
conditionality and, if necessary, to exert targeted reform 
pressure, differentiating between those who promote and 
those who obstruct reforms. And this makes it easier for 
vested interests to block reforms from the shadows. 
It also allows them to respond to reform pressure with 
superficial reforms – reforms that appear to address prob-
lems but in fact are rendered ineffective, be it through 
detail provisions or the leverage of vested interests over 
key personnel – or pocket reforms. These may appear 
sound in themselves but are fragmented and can easily be 
bypassed by oligarchic control or corrupt machinations. 
Furthermore, since most institutions and areas of legisla-
tion require some kind of reform, it is possible to sidetrack 
conditionality by presenting as successes minor reforms 
that do not meet much resistance.
To work effectively, conditionality needs to be based 
on clear priorities and concrete requirements. Finally, 
it needs to be backed by an EU that is ready to exert its 
leverage to the full. This calls for a series of measures:
 . Prioritizing: Functional state institutions that ensure 
the rule of law are the precondition for substantial 
progress in EaP countries. This requires in particular 
the independence of the judiciary, law enforcement 
authorities, and key regulatory bodies, without the 
interference of political actors, oligarchic control, and 
corrupt interests. In addition, legislation on the trans-
parency of state enterprises, offshoring, media control, 
and party financing is crucial to limiting the leverage 
of vested interests. In giving these areas priority, it is 
crucial to focus on “game-changer reforms”– reforms 
that will broadly and effectively change the rules of 
conduct for all actors in the country. An example of 
such a reform is to be found in Romania, namely in 
that country’s anti-corruption directorate (DNA): a 
single independent authority responsible for address-
ing all charges of high-level corruption. The DNA 
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has the power to directly conduct and supervise the 
whole process, from investigation to prosecution. The 
result is an institution strong enough so that even the 
most powerful oligarch cannot be sure of being able 
to control or bypass it.
 . Getting concrete: A detailed understanding of the 
desired reforms – not just the desired outcomes – is 
needed for measuring success. Implementing  
concrete individual reform steps makes it possible to 
identify resistance and apply pressure in a targeted 
way. The EU should be ready to respond to short-
comings not only with criticism but also by putting 
forward specific and comprehensive reform proposals. 
Models from other countries can be put forward. One 
example of a mechanism for working out such propos-
als is the peer review mission on the judiciary that 
the EU recently carried out in Moldova. Here experts 
from judicial authorities of EU member states pro-
vided their analysis and suggestions. Future models 
could involve independent local experts and members 
of civil society in such a mechanism.
 . Using EU leverage: This requires first of all putting 
the transformational agenda before geopolitics. If 
the EU shows a readiness to compromise on reform, 
vested interests will exploit this, rendering condition-
ality toothless. Vested interests within “pro-European” 
camps continue to be able to play with the threat of 
switching their allegiance from the EU to Russia. In 
fact, they still need the EU for political legitimacy 
and financial support. If the EU compromises, it will 
lose credibility still further, bringing about the very 
geopolitical turn they wished to avoid in the first 
place. The EU should instead insist that EaP countries 
stick to the commitments made in the Association 
Agreements. Failure to meet these commitments justi-
fies extending EU conditionality to reform proposals 
put forward by the EU itself, and in case of rejection, 
exerting pressure in the form of withholding finan-
cial support or suspending parts of the agreements 
(just as the countries are themselves free to opt out 
of the agreements). Instead of sharing the blame for 
malpractice, the EU should make greater use of public 
diplomacy and be more outspoken about reform re-
quirements and any resistance.
The Importance of Human Resources in 
Implementing Reforms
To promote real reforms, EU instruments would need to 
take effect at all stages of reform in which they could be 
frustrated: their design, their implementation, and the 
selection of key personnel. Particularly for the major task 
of institution building, human resources are crucial. The 
best reform concept for any state institution can only 
succeed – or be frustrated – through the selection of per-
sonnel. The EU should therefore be ready to take a more 
active role in developing personnel in EaP countries as 
well as contributing directly with its own missions to the 
design and implementation of reforms on the ground.
 . Civil service reforms and pay-scale reforms: Though 
improving pay will not alone reduce corruption, it is a 
precondition for attracting and retaining more quali-
fied personnel. Salaries for positions of responsibility in 
ministries, central agencies, the judiciary, and regula-
tory bodies need to be raised to levels found in similar 
jobs in the private sector. This would, moreover, ensure 
the financial independence of officials. The EU could 
both push this and ease the financial burden on EaP 
countries by offering budgetary support. This could 
take a regressive form, for instance a payment of 80 
percent in the first year, 60 percent in the second year, 
40 percent in the third year, and so on. In return, the 
EU could request that high professional standards be 
applied in selecting and promoting the public servants 
affected and see to it that EU officials are admitted to 
monitor procedures.
 . Selecting leaders of major institutions: Next to sound 
institutional reforms, the selection of independent, 
competent leaders for key law enforcement and regula-
tory bodies such as the Prosecutor General’s offices 
or the national banks is crucial. Public confidence in 
national institutions is often so limited that indepen-
dent candidates are unlikely even to enter a competi-
tion organized just on the national level. Nor, if they are 
selected, is the minimum level of public trust ensured 
for them to act truly independently. By participating, 
the EU, as an external actor, can restore confidence, 
keeping in check the influence of vested interests over 
selection procedures. The participation of EU represen-
tatives in selection procedures has in fact been suggest-
ed by previous Moldovan governments as well as  
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by Ukrainian reformers and members of civil society. 
In order to avoid interfering with states’ sovereignty, 
EU representatives could only cast consultative votes. 
Outvoting their advice, however, would cause consid-
erable political damage, and their participation alone 
would push the procedure toward more transparency 
and accountability.
 . Contributing EU missions: The EU should deploy stron-
ger missions to contribute directly to reforms in state 
institutions. Existing instruments like the EU high-level 
advisory missions have lacked, and continue to lack, 
manpower and leverage, as advisors can be sidelined 
and depend for effectiveness on those they advise. 
Providing the resources for stronger missions would 
require a closer combination of the Eastern Partner-
ship with the instruments of the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. A recent example is the EU advi-
sory mission that has been deployed in Ukraine since 
December 2014 to assist in the reform of the civilian 
security sector. Primary areas for the deployment  
of such missions should be the judiciary, law enforce-
ment, and key regulatory bodies. To be most effective, 
however, strong mandates are needed. To address 
concerns about sovereignty, the role would be non-ex-
ecutive but could go beyond merely advisory and train-
ing roles to also include assisting reform implementa-
tion, vetting of officials, monitoring, and reporting – in 
order to obtain both the intelligence and the capacity 
for targeted reforms as well as to back and capacitate 
reform forces on the ground. Since experts can easily 
be isolated when they are deployed individually, strong 
mission headquarters would be needed and should be 
tasked with pro-actively taking up reform requirements 
with all relevant authorities on the national level – thus  
reinforcing EU leverage for reforms.
 . Delegating officials to state institutions: Whereas EU 
missions cannot share executive functions, Ukraine 
has provided a model for employing foreigners in 
governmental positions by granting them Ukrainian 
citizenship. This model can also allow for EU experts 
to take up executive roles in non-political institutions, 
strengthening their capacities and helping to neutralize 
them against undue influence from political quarters or 
vested interests. The EU could support this by identi-
fying and delegating suitable personnel and provid-
ing financial assistance for their employment. Such 
programs could also enable recruiting members of the 
respective diaspora communities and facilitating their 
return, which could offer large sources of independent, 
knowledgeable, and competent experts.  
So far, the EU has been reluctant to involve itself to such 
an extent in the transformation of other countries. There 
is a reason for this, for the EU is rightly wary of contribut-
ing to the legitimacy of corrupt governments and bearing 
the blame in case of failure. The EU is also eager to avoid 
accusations that it is behaving in an imperial or  
neocolonial manner. A higher degree of EU involvement 
could prompt local elites to rely on the EU to fix their 
problems instead of striving to do so themselves. Finally, 
the EU has too many other challenges to address now and 
is not likely to make an ambitious remodeling of the EaP 
a priority.
Within EaP countries, however, European integration 
is already a matter not of foreign policy but of domestic 
politics. Moreover, for pro-European governments in the 
EaP, it is actually a major source, if not the major source, 
of their legitimacy. The EU will thus be associated in any 
case with political forces that identify themselves as pro-
European, and will anyway be blamed for their failures. 
This could be even more the case the more the EU keeps 
out of the domestic discourse and does not distinguish 
itself with more active involvement. The EU is already 
accused of behaving in a neocolonial manner; but it is 
the lack of progress that really damages its credibility. In 
the end, it is a matter of failure or success, and the risk 
of failure may outweigh the additional risk of greater 
involvement.
Hans Martin Sieg holds doctoral degrees in history and 
political science and is an associate fellow of the German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
Notes
 1 The EaP was launched in 2009 to support the 
transformation toward a liberal democracy based 
on the rule of law, good governance, and a market 
economy while offering gradual integration into 
the EU s´ common market, greater mobility for 
citizens, and closer political ties in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine. (Throughout this text, the term “post-
Soviet” excludes the Baltic countries of Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia.)
 2  Twelve countries joined the EU between 2004 
and 2007: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
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